- May 14, 2019
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Ira Weiny authored
To facilitate additional options to get_user_pages_fast() change the singular write parameter to be gup_flags. This patch does not change any functionality. New functionality will follow in subsequent patches. Some of the get_user_pages_fast() call sites were unchanged because they already passed FOLL_WRITE or 0 for the write parameter. NOTE: It was suggested to change the ordering of the get_user_pages_fast() arguments to ensure that callers were converted. This breaks the current GUP call site convention of having the returned pages be the final parameter. So the suggestion was rejected. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190328084422.29911-4-ira.weiny@intel.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190317183438.2057-4-ira.weiny@intel.com Signed-off-by:
Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com> Reviewed-by:
Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca> Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- May 10, 2019
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Petr Mladek authored
The commit 3e5903eb ("vsprintf: Prevent crash when dereferencing invalid pointers") broke boot on several architectures. The common pattern is that probe_kernel_read() is not working during early boot because userspace access framework is not ready. It is a generic problem. We have to avoid any complex external functions in vsprintf() code, especially in the common path. They might break printk() easily and are hard to debug. Replace probe_kernel_read() with some simple checks for obvious problems. Details: 1. Report on Power: Kernel crashes very early during boot with with CONFIG_PPC_KUAP and CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL_FEATURE_CHECK_DEBUG The problem is the combination of some new code called via printk(), check_pointer() which calls probe_kernel_read(). That then calls allow_user_access() (PPC_KUAP) and that uses mmu_has_feature() too early (before we've patched features). With the JUMP_LABEL debug enabled that causes us to call printk() & dump_stack() and we end up recursing and overflowing the stack. Because it happens so early you don't get any output, just an apparently dead system. The stack trace (which you don't see) is something like: ... dump_stack+0xdc probe_kernel_read+0x1a4 check_pointer+0x58 string+0x3c vsnprintf+0x1bc vscnprintf+0x20 printk_safe_log_store+0x7c printk+0x40 dump_stack_print_info+0xbc dump_stack+0x8 probe_kernel_read+0x1a4 probe_kernel_read+0x19c check_pointer+0x58 string+0x3c vsnprintf+0x1bc vscnprintf+0x20 vprintk_store+0x6c vprintk_emit+0xec vprintk_func+0xd4 printk+0x40 cpufeatures_process_feature+0xc8 scan_cpufeatures_subnodes+0x380 of_scan_flat_dt_subnodes+0xb4 dt_cpu_ftrs_scan_callback+0x158 of_scan_flat_dt+0xf0 dt_cpu_ftrs_scan+0x3c early_init_devtree+0x360 early_setup+0x9c 2. Report on s390: vsnprintf invocations, are broken on s390. For example, the early boot output now looks like this where the first (efault) should be the linux_banner: [ 0.099985] (efault) [ 0.099985] setup: Linux is running as a z/VM guest operating system in 64-bit mode [ 0.100066] setup: The maximum memory size is 8192MB [ 0.100070] cma: Reserved 4 MiB at (efault) [ 0.100100] numa: NUMA mode: (efault) The reason for this, is that the code assumes that probe_kernel_address() works very early. This however is not true on at least s390. Uaccess on KERNEL_DS works only after page tables have been setup on s390, which happens with setup_arch()->paging_init(). Any probe_kernel_address() invocation before that will return -EFAULT. Fixes: 3e5903eb ("vsprintf: Prevent crash when dereferencing invalid pointers") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190510084213.22149-1-pmladek@suse.com Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: "Tobin C . Harding" <me@tobin.cc> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@ozlabs.org> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Reviewed-by:
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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- May 06, 2019
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Andrey Ryabinin authored
The kernel the kernel is built with -Wvla for some time, so is not supposed to have any variable length arrays. Remove vla bounds checking from ubsan since it's useless now. Signed-off-by:
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Andrey Ryabinin authored
Building lib/ubsan.c with gcc-9 results in a ton of nasty warnings like this one: lib/ubsan.c warning: conflicting types for built-in function ‘__ubsan_handle_negate_overflow’; expected ‘void(void *, void *)’ [-Wbuiltin-declaration-mismatch] The kernel's declarations of __ubsan_handle_*() often uses 'unsigned long' types in parameters while GCC these parameters as 'void *' types, hence the mismatch. Fix this by using 'void *' to match GCC's declarations. Reported-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Fixes: c6d30853 ("UBSAN: run-time undefined behavior sanity checker") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- May 04, 2019
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Michal Kubecek authored
Add new validation flag NL_VALIDATE_NESTED which adds three consistency checks of NLA_F_NESTED_FLAG: - the flag is set on attributes with NLA_NESTED{,_ARRAY} policy - the flag is not set on attributes with other policies except NLA_UNSPEC - the flag is set on attribute passed to nla_parse_nested() Signed-off-by:
Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> v2: change error messages to mention NLA_F_NESTED explicitly Reviewed-by:
Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Reviewed-by:
David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Michal Kubecek authored
The check that attribute type is within 0...maxtype range in __nla_validate_parse() sets only error message but not bad_attr in extack. Set also bad_attr to tell userspace which attribute failed validation. Signed-off-by:
Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> Reviewed-by:
Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Reviewed-by:
David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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- May 03, 2019
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Vladimir Oltean authored
This provides an unified API for accessing register bit fields regardless of memory layout. The basic unit of data for these API functions is the u64. The process of transforming an u64 from native CPU encoding into the peripheral's encoding is called 'pack', and transforming it from peripheral to native CPU encoding is 'unpack'. Signed-off-by:
Vladimir Oltean <olteanv@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
Commit 1fd7c3b4 ("kobject: Improve doc clarity kobject_init_and_add()") tried to provide more clarity, but the reference to kobject_del() was incorrect. Fix that up by removing that line, and hopefully be more explicit as to exactly what needs to happen here once you register a kobject with the kobject core. Acked-by:
Tobin C. Harding <tobin@kernel.org> Fixes: 1fd7c3b4 ("kobject: Improve doc clarity kobject_init_and_add()") Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- May 02, 2019
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Tobin C. Harding authored
kernel-doc comments have a prescribed format. This includes parenthesis on the function name. To be _particularly_ correct we should also capitalise the brief description and terminate it with a period. In preparation for adding/updating kernel-doc function comments clean up the ones currently present. Signed-off-by:
Tobin C. Harding <tobin@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Tobin C. Harding authored
Currently the docstring for kobject_get_path() mentions 'kset'. The kset is not used in the function callchain starting from this function. Remove docstring reference to kset from the function kobject_get_path(). Signed-off-by:
Tobin C. Harding <tobin@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- May 01, 2019
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Gal Pressman authored
Similarly to dev/netdev/etc printk helpers, add standard printk helpers for the RDMA subsystem. Example output: efa 0000:00:06.0 efa_0: Hello World! efa_0: Hello World! (no parent device set) (NULL ib_device): Hello World! (ibdev is NULL) Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com> Suggested-by:
Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca> Suggested-by:
Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Gal Pressman <galpress@amazon.com> Reviewed-by:
Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by:
Shiraz Saleem <shiraz.saleem@intel.com> Reviewed-by:
Dennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
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Colin Ian King authored
The kobj pointer is being null-checked so potentially it could be null, however, the ktype declaration before the null check is dereferencing kobj hence we have a potential null pointer deference. Fix this by moving the assignment of ktype after kobj has been null checked. Addresses-Coverity: ("Dereference before null check") Fixes: aa30f47c ("kobject: Add support for default attribute groups to kobj_type") Signed-off-by:
Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- Apr 30, 2019
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Gary Hook authored
Enablement of AMD's Secure Memory Encryption feature is determined very early after start_kernel() is entered. Part of this procedure involves scanning the command line for the parameter 'mem_encrypt'. To determine intended state, the function sme_enable() uses library functions cmdline_find_option() and strncmp(). Their use occurs early enough such that it cannot be assumed that any instrumentation subsystem is initialized. For example, making calls to a KASAN-instrumented function before KASAN is set up will result in the use of uninitialized memory and a boot failure. When AMD's SME support is enabled, conditionally disable instrumentation of these dependent functions in lib/string.c and arch/x86/lib/cmdline.c. [ bp: Get rid of intermediary nostackp var and cleanup whitespace. ] Fixes: aca20d54 ("x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption") Reported-by:
Li RongQing <lirongqing@baidu.com> Signed-off-by:
Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Boris Brezillon <bbrezillon@kernel.org> Cc: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de> Cc: "dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@gmail.com> Cc: "luto@kernel.org" <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: "mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "peterz@infradead.org" <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/155657657552.7116.18363762932464011367.stgit@sosrh3.amd.com
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- Apr 29, 2019
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YueHaibing authored
Fix sparse warning: lib/vsprintf.c:673:6: warning: symbol 'pointer_string' was not declared. Should it be static? Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190426164630.22104-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com To: <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> To: <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> To: <geert+renesas@glider.be> To: <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by:
YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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Thomas Gleixner authored
All architectures which support stacktrace carry duplicated code and do the stack storage and filtering at the architecture side. Provide a consolidated interface with a callback function for consuming the stack entries provided by the architecture specific stack walker. This removes lots of duplicated code and allows to implement better filtering than 'skip number of entries' in the future without touching any architecture specific code. Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by:
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Cc: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com> Cc: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Cc: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> Cc: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Cc: linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com Cc: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Cc: Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch> Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com> Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie> Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com> Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com> Cc: Tom Zanussi <tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com> Cc: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190425094803.713568606@linutronix.de
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Thomas Gleixner authored
No more users of the struct stack_trace based interfaces. Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by:
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Cc: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com> Cc: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Cc: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> Cc: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Cc: linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com Cc: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Cc: Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch> Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com> Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie> Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com> Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com> Cc: Tom Zanussi <tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com> Cc: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190425094803.617937448@linutronix.de
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Thomas Gleixner authored
Replace the indirection through struct stack_trace with an invocation of the storage array based interface. Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by:
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Cc: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com> Cc: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Cc: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> Cc: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Cc: linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com Cc: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Cc: Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch> Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com> Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie> Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com> Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com> Cc: Tom Zanussi <tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com> Cc: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190425094802.158306076@linutronix.de
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Thomas Gleixner authored
The struct stack_trace indirection in the stack depot functions is a truly pointless excercise which requires horrible code at the callsites. Provide interfaces based on plain storage arrays. Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by:
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Cc: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com> Cc: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Cc: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> Cc: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Cc: linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com Cc: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Cc: Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch> Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com> Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie> Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com> Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com> Cc: Tom Zanussi <tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com> Cc: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190425094801.414574828@linutronix.de
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- Apr 28, 2019
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Tobin C. Harding authored
Function kobject_init_and_add() is currently misused in a number of places in the kernel. On error return kobject_put() must be called but is at times not. Make the function documentation more explicit about calling kobject_put() in the error path. Signed-off-by:
Tobin C. Harding <tobin@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Tobin C. Harding authored
There is currently some confusion on how to wind back kobject_init_and_add() during the error paths in code that uses this function. Add documentation to kobject_add() and kobject_del() to help clarify the usage. Signed-off-by:
Tobin C. Harding <tobin@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- Apr 27, 2019
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Johannes Berg authored
Unfortunately, we cannot add strict parsing for all attributes, as that would break existing userspace. We currently warn about it, but that's about all we can do. For new attributes, however, the story is better: nobody is using them, so we can reject bad sizes. Also, for new attributes, we need not accept them when the policy doesn't declare their usage. David Ahern and I went back and forth on how to best encode this, and the best way we found was to have a "boundary type", from which point on new attributes have all possible validation applied, and NLA_UNSPEC is rejected. As we didn't want to add another argument to all functions that get a netlink policy, the workaround is to encode that boundary in the first entry of the policy array (which is for type 0 and thus probably not really valid anyway). I put it into the validation union for the rare possibility that somebody is actually using attribute 0, which would continue to work fine unless they tried to use the extended validation, which isn't likely. We also didn't find any in-tree users with type 0. The reason for setting the "start strict here" attribute is that we never really need to start strict from 0, which is invalid anyway (or in legacy families where that isn't true, it cannot be set to strict), so we can thus reserve the value 0 for "don't do this check" and don't have to add the tag to all policies right now. Thus, policies can now opt in to this validation, which we should do for all existing policies, at least when adding new attributes. Note that entirely *new* policies won't need to set it, as the use of that should be using nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc. which anyway do fully strict validation now, regardless of this. So in effect, this patch only covers the "existing command with new attribute" case. Signed-off-by:
Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Johannes Berg authored
We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by:
Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Johannes Berg authored
Rather than using NLA_UNSPEC for this type of thing, use NLA_MIN_LEN so we can make NLA_UNSPEC be NLA_REJECT under certain conditions for future attributes. While at it, also use NLA_EXACT_LEN for the struct example. Signed-off-by:
Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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- Apr 26, 2019
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Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) authored
On my "Intel(R) Xeon(R) W-2135 CPU @ 3.70GHz" system(12 CPUs) i get the warning from the compiler about frame size: warning: the frame size of 1096 bytes is larger than 1024 bytes [-Wframe-larger-than=] the size of cpumask_t depends on number of CPUs, therefore just make use of cpumask_of() in set_cpus_allowed_ptr() as a second argument. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190418193925.9361-1-urezki@gmail.com Signed-off-by:
Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by:
Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@gmail.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Cc: Oleksiy Avramchenko <oleksiy.avramchenko@sonymobile.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joelaf@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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YueHaibing authored
If CONFIG_TEST_KMOD is set to M, while CONFIG_BLOCK is not set, XFS and BTRFS can not be compiled successly. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190410075434.35220-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com Fixes: d9c6a72d ("kmod: add test driver to stress test the module loader") Signed-off-by:
YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Reported-by:
Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Reviewed-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@redhat.com> Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Petr Mladek authored
The inlined error messages must be used carefully because they need to fit into the given buffer. Handle them using a custom wrapper that makes people aware of the problem. Also define a reasonable hard limit to avoid a completely insane usage. Suggested-by:
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190417115350.20479-11-pmladek@suse.com To: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: "Tobin C . Harding" <me@tobin.cc> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by:
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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Petr Mladek authored
We are able to detect invalid values handled by %p[iI] printk specifier. The current error message is "invalid address". It might cause confusion against "(efault)" reported by the generic valid_pointer_address() check. Let's unify the style and use the more appropriate error code description "(einval)". Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190417115350.20479-10-pmladek@suse.com To: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: "Tobin C . Harding" <me@tobin.cc> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by:
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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Petr Mladek authored
We already prevent crash when dereferencing some obviously broken pointers. But the handling is not consistent. Sometimes we print "(null)" only for pure NULL pointer, sometimes for pointers in the first page and sometimes also for pointers in the last page (error codes). Note that printk() call this code under logbuf_lock. Any recursive printks are redirected to the printk_safe implementation and the messages are stored into per-CPU buffers. These buffers might be eventually flushed in printk_safe_flush_on_panic() but it is not guaranteed. This patch adds a check using probe_kernel_read(). It is not a full-proof test. But it should help to see the error message in 99% situations where the kernel would silently crash otherwise. Also it makes the error handling unified for "%s" and the many %p* specifiers that need to read the data from a given address. We print: + (null) when accessing data on pure pure NULL address + (efault) when accessing data on an invalid address It does not affect the %p* specifiers that just print the given address in some form, namely %pF, %pf, %pS, %ps, %pB, %pK, %px, and plain %p. Note that we print (efault) from security reasons. In fact, the real address can be seen only by %px or eventually %pK. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190417115350.20479-9-pmladek@suse.com To: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: "Tobin C . Harding" <me@tobin.cc> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by:
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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Petr Mladek authored
There are few printk formats that make sense only with two or more specifiers. Also some specifiers make sense only when a kernel feature is enabled. The handling of unknown specifiers is inconsistent and not helpful. Using WARN() looks like an overkill for this type of error. pr_warn() is not good either. It would by handled via printk_safe buffer and it might be hard to match it with the problematic string. A reasonable compromise seems to be writing the unknown format specifier into the original string with a question mark, for example (%pC?). It should be self-explaining enough. Note that it is in brackets to follow the (null) style. Note that it introduces a warning about that test_hashed() function is unused. It is going to be used again by a later patch. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190417115350.20479-8-pmladek@suse.com To: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: "Tobin C . Harding" <me@tobin.cc> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by:
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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Petr Mladek authored
Move code from the long pointer() function. We are going to improve error handling that will make it even more complicated. This patch does not change the existing behavior. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190417115350.20479-7-pmladek@suse.com To: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: "Tobin C . Harding" <me@tobin.cc> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by:
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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Petr Mladek authored
Move the code from the long pointer() function. We are going to improve error handling that will make it more complicated. This patch does not change the existing behavior. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190417115350.20479-6-pmladek@suse.com To: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: "Tobin C . Harding" <me@tobin.cc> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by:
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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Petr Mladek authored
Move the non-trivial code from the long pointer() function. We are going to improve error handling that will make it even more complicated. This patch does not change the existing behavior. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190417115350.20479-5-pmladek@suse.com To: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: "Tobin C . Harding" <me@tobin.cc> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by:
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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Petr Mladek authored
We are going to check the address using probe_kernel_address(). It will be more expensive and it does not make sense for well known address. This patch splits the string() function. The variant without the check is then used on locations that handle string constants or strings defined as local variables. This patch does not change the existing behavior. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190417115350.20479-4-pmladek@suse.com To: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: "Tobin C . Harding" <me@tobin.cc> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by:
Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Reviewed-by:
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
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Petr Mladek authored
restricted_pointer() pretends that it prints the address when kptr_restrict is set to zero. But it is never called in this situation. Instead, pointer() falls back to ptr_to_id() and hashes the pointer. This patch removes the potential confusion. klp_restrict is checked only in restricted_pointer(). It actually fixes a small race when the address might get printed unhashed: CPU0 CPU1 pointer() if (!kptr_restrict) /* for example set to 2 */ restricted_pointer() /* echo 0 >/proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict */ proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin() klpr_restrict = 0; switch(kptr_restrict) case 0: break: number() Fixes: ef0010a3 ("vsprintf: don't use 'restricted_pointer()' when not restricting") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190417115350.20479-3-pmladek@suse.com To: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> To: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: "Tobin C . Harding" <me@tobin.cc> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by:
Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by:
Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Reviewed-by:
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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Petr Mladek authored
This is just a preparation step for further changes. The patch does not change the code. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190417115350.20479-2-pmladek@suse.com To: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: "Tobin C . Harding" <me@tobin.cc> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by:
Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by:
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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- Apr 25, 2019
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Kimberly Brown authored
kobj_type currently uses a list of individual attributes to store default attributes. Attribute groups are more flexible than a list of attributes because groups provide support for attribute visibility. So, add support for default attribute groups to kobj_type. In future patches, the existing uses of kobj_type’s attribute list will be converted to attribute groups. When that is complete, kobj_type’s attribute list, “default_attrs”, will be removed. Signed-off-by:
Kimberly Brown <kimbrownkd@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Stephen Rothwell authored
In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch cases where we are expecting to fall through. This patch aims to suppress up to 18 missing-break-in-switch false positives on some architectures. Cc: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by:
Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Reviewed-by:
Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Eric Biggers authored
The flags field in 'struct shash_desc' never actually does anything. The only ostensibly supported flag is CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP. However, no shash algorithm ever sleeps, making this flag a no-op. With this being the case, inevitably some users who can't sleep wrongly pass MAY_SLEEP. These would all need to be fixed if any shash algorithm actually started sleeping. For example, the shash_ahash_*() functions, which wrap a shash algorithm with the ahash API, pass through MAY_SLEEP from the ahash API to the shash API. However, the shash functions are called under kmap_atomic(), so actually they're assumed to never sleep. Even if it turns out that some users do need preemption points while hashing large buffers, we could easily provide a helper function crypto_shash_update_large() which divides the data into smaller chunks and calls crypto_shash_update() and cond_resched() for each chunk. It's not necessary to have a flag in 'struct shash_desc', nor is it necessary to make individual shash algorithms aware of this at all. Therefore, remove shash_desc::flags, and document that the crypto_shash_*() functions can be called from any context. Signed-off-by:
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- Apr 24, 2019
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Peter Zijlstra authored
Randy reported objtool triggered on his (GCC-7.4) build: lib/strncpy_from_user.o: warning: objtool: strncpy_from_user()+0x315: call to __ubsan_handle_add_overflow() with UACCESS enabled lib/strnlen_user.o: warning: objtool: strnlen_user()+0x337: call to __ubsan_handle_sub_overflow() with UACCESS enabled This is due to UBSAN generating signed-overflow-UB warnings where it should not. Prior to GCC-8 UBSAN ignored -fwrapv (which the kernel uses through -fno-strict-overflow). Make the functions use 'unsigned long' throughout. Reported-by:
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by:
Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> # build-tested Acked-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: luto@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190424072208.754094071@infradead.org Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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- Apr 19, 2019
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Mark Rutland authored
The help text for CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_KCOV is stale, and describes the feature as being enabled only for x86_64, when it is now enabled for several architectures, including arm, arm64, powerpc, and s390. Let's remove that stale help text, and update it along the lines of hat for ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE, better describing when an architecture should select CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_KCOV. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190412102733.5154-1-mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by:
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Acked-by:
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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